Local steps in an international career: a Danish-style consensus conference                in Austria by Seifert, Franz
www.ssoar.info
Local steps in an international career: a Danish-
style consensus conference in Austria
Seifert, Franz
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Seifert, F. (2006). Local steps in an international career: a Danish-style consensus conference in Austria. Public
Understanding of Science, 15(1), 73-88. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662506058383
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-223989
Local steps in an international career: a Danish-style
consensus conference in Austria
Franz Seifert
The article gives an account of the first Austrian nationwide Danish-style
consensus conference, held in the summer of 2003, treating policy issues
related to genetic data. Consensus conferences are currently widely discussed
for their promise to democratize fields of technological decision-making
which are both crucial to the fate of modern society and inaccessible to public
involvement. Instead of evaluating the “democratic efficiency” of the deliber-
ative exercise, the essay will contextualize the event in local, as well as
international developments comprising discursive, institutional and political
elements. Rather than offering definitive claims about the normative sig-
nificance of the rapidly diffusing deliberative technique, the discussion of a
local experience with it will arrive at ambivalent conclusions.
1. Introduction
The relationship between technology policy and the public is structured by two major
countervailing developments. On the one hand, nations are locked into a global race for
technological innovation. An economy’s capacity to create and exploit high-tech innovations
has come to be considered crucial for the making and preserving of the wealth of nations.
Political systems of the OECD area and a growing number of emerging economies therefore
came to prioritize this capacity and to instigate a variety of programs and reforms for its
promotion (Lare´do and Mustar, 2001).
On the other hand, new social movements occasionally might succeed in hampering, or
even blocking technological modernization projects. While employing a broad spectrum of
political strategies, their most potent political tool is the rallying of mass support. Making
use of rare situational opportunities for attracting mass attention, drawing on moral authority
and challenging the legitimacy of government and corporate interests, protesters at times
may muster general approval and thus force political systems to revise or even step back
from technological projects. The current halt of agricultural and food biotechnology in the
European Union is but the most recent illustration of this massive veto potential wielded by
the general public and its mobilizing agents respectively.
As a result, new ways are sought to cope with these “problematic publics” (Davison et
al., 1997). Besides eagerly surveying public attitudes in delicate fields such as risky or
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ethically dubious technologies, political systems draw on a widening repertoire of “partici-
patory” and “deliberative” approaches for the public. The discourse accompanying these
practices regularly depicts technological change as a generator of ethical ambiguity, whose
responsible use requires more informed, more legitimate political approaches.1 The partici-
patory and deliberative techniques employed for this purpose take on a multitude of shapes,
ranging from “round tables” with experts and interested parties to “citizen polls”, which
entail more or less representative samples of “the people” (Weale, 2001). Accordingly, the
factual achievements and normative evaluation of such experiments with public involvement
in the policy process vary. It can be regarded as a purely technical source of scientific
expertise, allowing regulators and policymakers to keep up with rapid technological change.
In such cases, deliberative and participatory techniques go along with the functional-elitist
conceptions of the state.
More frequently, however, participation and deliberation are associated with norma-
tively demanding “models of democracy,” which disapprove of legalistic or technocratic
state conceptions, add to and go beyond the set of constitutionally prescribed procedures of
representative democracy.2 Deliberation then implies the Habermasian notion of a
“coercion-free discourse” antithetical to a real world of closed bureaucracies and vested
interests. While participation hints at similarly idealistic, egalitarian and emphatic ideas of
democracy, it implies inclusion and the enlargement of the circle of participants.
Likewise, since the “technological issues” at stake are of a complex nature and require
special cognitive effort from laypeople to be properly understood and debated, a democratic
rationalization of the various emerging participatory and deliberative practices needs to
reflect on the normative status of the social distribution of knowledge. Again, we observe a
tension between functional-elitist and egalitarian notions of knowledge. Conventional
advisory committees use certain approaches under the headings of “Participatory Technol-
ogy Assessment” (TA), “Technology Delphis,” and—currently in vogue—broad informa-
tion campaigns promoting the “Public Understanding of Science,” coinciding with
expertocratic approaches as they affirm the distinction between the cognitive haves and
have-nots.3 Conversely, participatory exercises such as “citizen juries” or “consensus
conferences” aim at overcoming the expert/lay divide and concede to the general public the
required intellectual capacity to arrive at wise decisions in technological matters.
The current debate on the political shaping of technological change gains its impetus
from the tension between these normative poles. It reiterates a number of questions. Do
experiments with deliberation and participation in technology policy actually signal a move
from “the powers that be” to some version of “strong democracy” (Barber, 1984)? If the
public is involved, who actually is involved? Do such techniques engage a representative
majority or, more likely, only a minority of the public? And how real, how consequential, is
this involvement? Do they ignite wider “public debates” and contribute to the formation of
an informed public opinion, which might ultimately leave its mark on regulation and policy
formation? Or do they pass without substantial effect and mainly help authorities to garner
acceptance and present themselves as a responsibly acting government?
Far from promising unambiguous answers to these questions, the following article aims
at adding to the debate by highlighting a deliberative exercise—a “consensus conference
Danish-style”—recently carried out in Austria. Its intent is not to give a technical
“evaluation” of this exercise based on standard criteria.4 “Evaluation of the performance of
public participation,” as Steve Rayner recently mentioned, “is problematic.”
It is almost exclusively self-evaluation performed by the organisers of the consultation
or engagement activity or sympathetic evaluation by social scientists known to be
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committed to the principles or techniques employed. Most evaluation is of single
projects. There is very little systematic or comparative evaluation across multiple sites
and different techniques. The focus of evaluation is almost exclusively process based,
for example, looking at how closely the activity corresponded to Habermasian “ideal
free speech” or how the participants behaved or said that they felt about each other.
(Rayner, 2003: 167)
Rather than measuring the “performance” of the participatory event, this account will take a
slightly different approach. While it portrays yet another national experience with a
participatory technique, it will also focus on contextual information and regard the Austrian
deliberative conference against the background of recent political developments at the
national as well as international level. Its aim is not to arrive at a conclusive assessment, but
to raise further questions about the normative significance of experimenting with partici-
patory and deliberative techniques by highlighting their local occurrence, which might
inspire more research in the future.
Empirical statements are based on interviews with key actors among organizers,
observing journalists and advising experts, as well as the study of related documents and
online searches of media reports. As regards Austria’s political culture and its recent
dynamics, the analysis draws on abundant materials derived from a research project on
Austria’s biotechnology policy under conditions of globalization.
Before going into the details of the Austrian experience, an outline of the Danish
consensus conference model as well as its international career in recent years will be given.
Then follows a draft of Austria’s political culture, as it pertains to participation and
deliberation, and recent trends in the transformation of this culture.
2. Danish-style consensus conference: an international career
The “Danish-style” consensus conference is one among a number of deliberative variants
committed to an emphatic model of democracy. Beyond making available more direct
channels of influence on political decision-making to “the people” than those provided by
the institutional repertoire of representative democracy, the Danish consensus conference
aims at reversing the hierarchy between laypeople and experts.
The procedure foresees that about a dozen “ordinary citizens” engage in an informed
debate on a complex, mostly technological issue with the goal of attaining a common
position, which in turn, might serve as a recommendation for political decision-makers.
First, the organizers select citizens randomly or according to some representative criteria.
Care is taken to ensure that volunteers, while showing concern for the matter, are not
politically involved in the subject in order to avoid distortions of sound debate owing to
single interest interventions. Then, in preparation, the lay panel is provided with abundant
information and enabled to question experts of its own choice. Participants are supposed to
be in full control of the interviews as well as the final debate and to arrive at conclusions as
autonomously as possible. Their concluding suggestions are publicly handed over to the
authorities, whose constitutional prerogatives, however, are not affected. The conference’s
recommendations remain optional and are not binding to the political decision-making
process.
The term consensus conference has its origin in US technology assessment (TA)
process and is still widely used for certain types of expert summits on medical issues. The
understanding of the consensus conference as a citizen-based deliberative exercise, however,
had emerged in the Danish political culture of the 1980s, well known for its prolific
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experimentation with inclusionary, participatory practices. There, it was the influential
Danish Technology Board that first employed the instrument in the mid 1980s.5 The Board,
which had been established in order to assess the social impacts of new technologies and to
advise the Danish parliament and government, pursued an outspokenly democratic ap-
proach. It stressed the egalitarian elements of consensus conferences, which should be
designed to foster public debate, break expert dominance and enhance the status of the
“ordinary citizen.” The first consensus conference in that vein discussed the subject of
“biotechnology in industry and agriculture.” It was held in 1987 when Denmark went
through a comprehensive public debate on biotechnology.6 To this day, 22 conferences have
followed in Denmark (Table 1). They have treated issues as diverse as human infertility and
noise pollution. The most recent one took place in 2003 and addressed the problem of
determining the monetary value of environmental benefits and losses. Scheduled for
November 2005 is a consensus conference on brain science.
The Danish consensus model proved successful locally. In the 1990s, institutions in a
number of industrial nations experimented with the Danish model (Table 2). Typically,
national TA agencies embraced the deliberative exercise. For example, the “Rathenau
Instituut” in the Netherlands, the “Zentrum fu¨r Technologiefolgen-Abscha¨tzung” in Switzer-
land and the “Teknologirådet” in Norway became local centers repeatedly conducting
consensus conferences. So it seems that, ironically, the effort of egalitarian de-specialization
spawned new breeds of specialists, that the international rise of the Danish consensus
technique aiming at subordinating the esoteric knowledge of expert elites to the common
sense of “ordinary laypeople” is linked to the emergence of new expert networks and
academic career venues for intellectual authorities in technological egalitarianism.
Table 1. Consensus conferences in Denmark
Year Issue
1987 Gene Technology in Industry and Agriculture
1988 The Citizen and dangerous Production
1989 Human Genome Mapping
Food Irradiation
1990 Air Pollution
1991 Educational Technology
1992 Technological Animals
1993 The Future of Private Automobiles
Infertility
1994 Electronic Identity Cards
A Light-green Agricultural Sector
Information Technology in Transportation
1995 Chemical substances in Food and the Environment
Gene Therapy
1996 The Future of Fishing
Future Consumption and Environment
1997 Teleworking
1999 Genetically modified Food
2000 Noise and Technology
Electronic Surveillance
2001 Roadpricing
2002 Testing our Genes
2003 How do we assign Value to the Environment?
Source: http://www.tekno.dk (accessed June 2005).
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Another accompanying feature of the international rise of the Danish consensus model
is its close association with issues related to genetic engineering and biotechnology. The
high incidence of consensus conferences on these issues is remarkable, as well as the fact
that the international use of the Danish model for these is higher than in Denmark itself:
while in Denmark about 22 percent of all consensus conferences focused on biotechnology,
in the international environment the share is 58 percent (Tables 1 and 2). Furthermore,
among consensus conferences on biotechnology, debates on genetically modified food stand
out: in seven out of the 16 countries that had consensus conferences, those conferences were
conducted on genetically modified food.
Evidently, these proportions mirror the institutional perception of biotechnology as a
public problem in many countries, or as one might also put it, the perception of the public as
a problem for supportive biotechnology policies in these countries. Without suggesting a
simple causality, one might contend that the international rise of the Danish consensus
model—to a considerable extent—owes itself to the international rise of public controversies
over biotechnology. This picture is confirmed by the fact that in most countries that held
Table 2. Consensus conferences Danish-style worldwide
Year Country Issue
1993 Netherlands Genetically modified Animals
1994 United Kingdom Plant Biotechnology
1995 Netherlands Research in Human Genetics
1996 Netherlands Natural Resources
New Zealand Plant Biotechnology
Norway Genetically modified Food
1997 Austria Tropospheric Ozone
USA Telecommunications and Democracy
1998 France Genetically modified Organisms
Japan Gene Therapy
South Korea Genetically modified Food
Switzerland Electricity
1999 Australia Genetically modified Food
Canada Genetically modified Food
Japan Information Society
South Korea Cloning
New Zealand Biotechnological Pest Control
Switzerland Genetically modified Food
United Kingdom Radioactive Waste
2000 Israel Traffic
Norway Genetically modified Food (follow-up to 1996)
Norway Elderly People in the Information Society
Switzerland Transplantation Medicine
2001 Germany Genetic Testing
Israel Unemployment
Norway Stem Cells and Therapeutic Cloning
2002 USA Genetically modified Food
2003 Austria Genetic Data
Norway Future Heating of Norwegian Homes
USA Future of Food
2004 Switzerland Research involving Human Beings
Italy GMO Research
2005 USA Responsible Nanotechnologies
Source: http://www.loka.org and research by author.
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consensus conferences on biotechnology issues, the general public was either particularly
sensitive, had experienced sharp biotechnology conflicts in the past, or was presently going
through such conflicts.7 Equally, the climax in consensus exercises on genetically modified
food in the late 1990s, when national and European authorities were under pressure from a
strong movement against these foods, testifies to the strong linkage between experimenting
with deliberative techniques and occurrence of public conflicts.
3. Austria: political culture, modernization conflicts and recent ruptures
To better gauge the Austrian experience with the Danish model, the local context first needs
to be taken into account. The features of this context are a rather unreceptive cultural and
institutional milieu for participatory initiatives, an occasionally powerful protest culture and,
since 2000, far-reaching political ruptures.
First, political culture and mentality are a result of history, which, in the case of Austria,
is one of late and interrupted democratization. Neither the Habsburg Empire with its subtle,
seemingly ever-lasting rule, nor the authoritarian, Catholic “Sta¨ndestaat” from 1934 to 1938
or Austria’s subsequent incorporation into the Nazi German Reich until 1945 were
particularly conducive to the development of civic virtues in Austrian political culture, least
of all of progressive ideas of “participatory democracy.”
Second, in the years of the “Second Republic” from 1955 onward, the Austrian
bureaucracy constituted a major obstacle to participatory experimenting. Being both highly
influential and inaccessible to citizens’ demands, administrative expert elites typically
prepare laws and design policies in seclusion.
Third, two major governing parties typically dominated political life, at the expense of
groups at the margins of the political spectrum. For a long time, these parties were the Social
Democrats (SP ¨O) and the conservative Austrian People’s Party ( ¨OVP), governing in a
“Grand Coalition.” The formation of a new coalition government of ¨OVP and the right-wing
Freedom Party (FP ¨O) in February 2000, however, shattered the system. Though, since then,
the Social Democrats’ influence in public life is being progressively dismantled, the system
has not become more inclusive. Rather, the subsequent polarization of political life has
brought about a hardening of government policy.
Fourth, the “social partners” classically are part and parcel of the Austrian decision-
making process. The neo-corporatist arrangement, joining together corporate labor and
capital, had been set up in the postwar years in order to negotiate class compromise at elite
level and thus forestall open social striving of the working classes. A key element of the
arrangement is its avoidance of public controversy. Decisions are intimately negotiated
behind closed doors, while symbolic controversies divert public attention.8 The influence of
this neo-corporatist arrangement equally retreated in recent years, accelerated by the
government’s reshuffling in 2000.
If party dominance and opaque decision structures are averse to public debate on
common issues, policies pertaining to science and technology are even more remote from
public scrutiny. One reason is that, traditionally, such policies were of minor importance for
the rather retarded development of Austrian high-tech industries. Furthermore, policies
supportive of science and technology, for a long time depended (and to some degree still
depend) on fragmented and clientelistic structures and therefore remained hard to grasp for
the public. And finally, media interest in science and technology is traditionally moderate in
Austria.9
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Then again, the Austrian public is far from being entirely unmoved by issues linked to
science and technology. On some occasions, powerful protest movements scored veritable
victories against the political establishment by mobilizing the public against technological
projects (Gottweis, 2000). In the late 1970s, a civil movement of unprecedented force
obstructed governmental plans to put a nuclear power plant into operation, and thus blocked
any future use of nuclear power in Austria. Later, in the mid 1980s, the equally spectacular
thwarting of a hydropower project led to the formation of the “Greens,” who, since then,
have constituted one of the four parliamentary parties. Finally, in the late 1990s, the
controversy over genetically modified food and agricultural biotechnology aroused the
public ire, provoking the second largest popular initiative in Austria’s political history and
forced the government to adopt highly rigorous biotechnology policies.10
These contentious episodes left their marks on Austria’s political culture. Besides the
parliamentary Greens, a dense web of environmental non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) has taken root, some of which in a latent alliance with the powerful popular press.
Even so, the protest strand in the country’s political culture has not brought about its
“participatory modernization.” Official political discourse stresses the importance of envi-
ronmental protection and consumer safety and a number of environmental associations are
supported and thus, to some degree, are co-opted by the state. However, there is neither an
animated and autonomous public debate on trajectories of technological modernization, nor
any experimenting with institutional channels conducive to such a debate (Seifert, 2003).
Finally, an appropriate account of Austria’s political landscape needs to consider recent
ruptures. The importance of the change from the seemingly everlasting Grand Coalition to a
conservative coalition government in early 2000 can hardly be overestimated. As one major
consequence, the traditional consociational pattern of conflict resolution gave way to a rather
adversarial style of political decision-making.11
This Austrian “Wende” also finds expression in major institutional restructurings in
higher education, science and technology policy.12 In an unprecedented move, the country’s
research infrastructure—universities and public research institutes—was subjected to far-
reaching reforms. The overall aim was to enhance international competitiveness, striving to
undo the ills of fragmentation and the until now common “something-for-everybody
principle” in technology policy that had obstructed policy initiatives for so long in the past.
Therefore, centralized hierarchical decision structures covering all domains of state-funded
applied research are being installed, while public spending is being cut in research fields
deemed useless for enhancing national competitiveness, such as the arts, humanities and
social sciences. Again, rather than being consensually established out of consideration for
affected groups, often decisions were pushed through, often against severe protest.13
4. The Austrian “Bu¨rgerInnenkonferenz”
In the consensus conference titled “Bu¨rgerInnenkonferenz Genetische Daten. Woher, Wohin,
Wozu?”14 the issue under debate was the potential use and abuse of genetic data. The
conference was the second of its kind in Austria, yet the first—at least according to its stated
intent—of nationwide impetus.15
Sponsor of the conference was the “Austrian Council—Rat fu¨r Forschung und Techno-
logieentwicklung.” In 2000, the committee, composed of eight personalities from industry
and academia, had been instated by the new Austrian government to function as a central
advisory body in designing and steering the current reform in science and technology policy.
The highly influential commission thus represents a major element of the recent rupture.
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From its very beginning, the improvement of public acceptance of science and technology
figured high among the Council’s priorities. In September 2002 the Council instigated a
broad image campaign comprising, among others, three public relations (PR) and lobbying
companies, some editorial offices of the Austrian broadcasting agency ORF16 and various
ministries and private associations engaged in the enhancement of the “Public Under-
standing of Science” (RFT, 2003). The awareness campaign consisted of 40 projects, among
them, the creation of a trademark in science and technology, the launching of the web-based
image campaign www.innovatives-oesterreich.at and the establishment of “centers of
communication” endowing large research corporations with know-how in public relations.
The consensus conference was one among these initiatives.
The idea to run a deliberative exercise as part of the general awareness package had
come up in early 2001.17 “Communication Matters,” one of the three PR agencies, who so
far had been engaged in conventional science communications, and civil servants from the
ranks of the ministerial bureaucracy brought it up and got it through the steering committee
in charge of the campaign.
The PR agency was inexperienced in running consensus conferences. To better
understand the deliberative technique project managers first had to enquire with local and
international experts and review the literature. Actually, acquiring this expertise was among
the agency’s main motives for engaging in the exercise. By capitalizing on the favorable
circumstances of a well funded image campaign, the new technique could be tried out at an
early stage: there is an international trend towards consensus conferences, which might
represent a promising model for the emerging domestic market in science communication.
Acquiring firsthand know-how would provide a competitive edge should it come to the
broader implementation of the model in Austria (Menasse, 2003: 68).
Conversely, the issue to be debated in the consensus conference was of minor
importance. Initial ideas had revolved around problems of nuclear energy, traffic congestion
or human stem cell research, but they were all discarded for being too controversial. Finally,
the problems surrounding the production, use and possible abuse of genetic data were
chosen as the appropriate issue to be debated.
There was no obvious reason for suggesting this choice. The large public outcry in
Austria over genetic engineering had focused on different issues—biotechnology in food
and agriculture—and had disappeared from the media agenda by 2000. Furthermore, with
respect to genetic data no decision-making process was imminent and no debate going on.
However, the topic was “at hand.” In 2001, the Austrian Council had instigated a major
technology initiative: the genomics program GEN-AU.18 In the wake of GEN-AU, exercises
in interactive science communication focusing on genetic testing already had been carried
out. The organizing association, “dialog < > gentechnik” (dialogue < > genetic
engineering), had the required expert knowledge and, upon request from the organizers,
proved eager to provide its expertise in the planned consensus conference.19
Considering the group’s origin and raison d’etre, its eagerness to contribute to the
conference is not surprising. dialog < > gentechnik had come into being in the late 1990s
as the direct result of the Austrian biotechnology conflict. At that time, faced with acute
public hostility, Austria’s biotechnological research community had set up the organization
with the aim of actively fostering the public image of Austria’s bioscience.20
In other cases, the organizers’ quest to integrate external information sources and thus
social protagonists into the project worked out as well, albeit less smoothly. When an expert
from the major Austrian TA unit was invited to participate, he and the backing institution
fervently refused at first. The fact that a commercial agency was conducting the procedure as
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part of a broad image campaign with the ultimate purpose to advance public acceptance for
science and technology did not correspond with the institution’s normative understanding of
a deliberative exercise.21 Yet, after some discussion, the expert fitted into the arrange-
ment.22
Finally, the TA expert, an executive of dialog < > gentechnik, a university professor
in molecular biology, at the same time chairman of dialog < > gentechnik, and a university
professor in the sociology of science constituted a working group responsible for designing
the exercise (science.orf.at, 2003). As well as the required cognitive input, this broader
inclusion of external scientists from academia helped to bestow the procedure with the air of
impartiality and legitimacy.23 With the working group’s help, another advisory body—the
scientific advisory board—was assembled. It comprised seven experts covering the fields of
technology assessment, medicine, bioethics, human genetics, policy and law. These experts
then proposed a larger range of experts as candidates to be questioned by the laypeople
during the conference (Communication Matters, 2003: 52–7).
In order to compose a representative lay panel, invitations were sent to a random
selection of 4000 people, 105 of whom submitted letters of application. From these, 12
people were finally selected according to demographic criteria.24 During two workshops in
April and May 2003 participants acquainted themselves with the issues at stake and
consented on a catalogue of issues to be examined more closely.25 These issues were genetic
counseling and research, genetic screening, data protection and ethical aspects. Other
subjects under discussion such as prenatal diagnosis, preimplantation genetic diagnosis and
research on human stem cells were discarded for reasons of time limitation. Next, from the
issue catalogue, the lay panel formulated a number of questions and chose a selection of
experts from the list composed by the advisory board to whom the questions were to be
addressed.
The expert hearings took place on a Friday and Saturday in late June. The Sunday
thereafter was dedicated to the working out of a set of recommendations which consisted of
various major points such as: the obligatory provision of psychological counseling for
patients faced with a grave diagnosis, the improvement of public education on genetic data,
public support for independent research, cautious regulations for mass screenings, highest
standards in data protection and a lowering of the age limit for voluntary genetic testing.
On Monday, these recommendations were presented in a press conference and formally
handed over to the chairman of the sponsoring Austrian Council, who, together with the
organizers, declared the deliberative exercise a success worthy of further consideration
(science.orf.at, 2003). Some days after, a delegation of the conference, the Council’s
chairman and the head of the organizing PR agency handed the recommendations over to the
Chairman of Parliament who welcomed the initiative and promised to pass the conference’s
recommendations on to members of parliament.
Public and media attention for the event was very poor. Apart from observers with a
professional interest and participants immediately involved, only interested visitors attended
the press conference. Just as small was the event’s resonance in the mass media, the ORF
was the only media group to take any real interest in the conference. Highlights included a
story in the ORF late news and a background report in an ORF radio program. Also, the
ORF Internet platform for science news, involved in the broad information campaign on
science and technology, covered the event with four reports and two commentaries. Much
feebler was media reporting beyond the ORF. The private print media corporations took
little notice. Online research resulted in five articles in three daily newspapers and about an
equal number in more specialized journals.
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5. Discussion
It is difficult to conclusively assess the political impact of the Bu¨rgerInnenkonferenz. Rapid
technological change drives decision-making in Austria as elsewhere, rendering future
debates unforeseeable. Yet, given the virtual absence of current debates on issues related to
genetic data, such an influence on regulation or policymaking is improbable.
As all evidence demonstrates, political decision-makers never took notice of the event.
While the citizens’ recommendations had been passed to parliament with much fanfare, the
issue was never discussed or even mentioned in parliamentary deliberations.26 Nor were
administrative policymakers ever systematically confronted with the results of the deliber-
ative exercise.27 Furthermore, at that time, there were virtually no legislative projects upon
which the consensus conference could have had any effect.28 Neither the Austrian Data
Protection Act nor the Electronic Data Transmission Act, which regulate aspects of genetic
data protection and therefore might be considered candidates for political influence, were
being amended at the time of the exercise. The same holds true for the Austrian Act on
Genetic Engineering.29 Imminent at the time of the conference was the amendment of the
Act on Reproductive Medicine. In this case, however, debates which might have had an
impact on the process, like a debate on human stem cell research, were excluded from the
panel’s agenda, either in the conceptual stage or in the course of the panel’s deliberations.
Such definitional exclusions were warranted with time pressure or—outspokenly—with the
topic’s controversial nature. The avoidance of contentious matters was among the organ-
izers’ goals, whose major interest was to successfully stage an innovative device of scientific
communication.
If there was no relevant political effect, one might search for effects the consensus
technique had on the wider public. As is standard with deliberative exercises, the quest for
a “broad public debate” was among the stated motives. From a normative perspective, such
indirect effects may indeed be considered crucial: common sense assessments carried out by
a handful of selected citizens hardly represent “the people” of a given polity, nor do they
necessarily supersede technical expertise routinely invested in the policy process. Moreover,
since outside of Denmark, consensus conferences are run as mere procedural experiments,
their legal legitimacy with respect to the flow of authoritatively binding decisions is unclear,
which leaves them usually with the status of an advisory committee, among others,
delivering their recommendations on a non-binding basis. All this might lead us to consider
the actual results of a consensus conference as less important than its various effects such as,
for instance, the triggering of media debates or the demonstration of the very possibility of
the “technological citizen.”30 Likewise, it is these side effects on the larger public from
which we might realistically expect any substantial influence on the political decision-
making process.
The fact that no such side effects occurred in the Austrian case does not come as a
surprise for anyone acquainted with Austrian media discourse on science and technology.
While organizers were eager to publicize the event, “scientific” matters rarely attract public
attention. Moreover, since there was no perceptible political significance, newspaper editors
didn’t have any incentive to report on it, notwithstanding the PR agency’s professional
efforts to spread the word. At any rate, the virtual absence of media resonance reinforces the
impression of the event’s general pettiness. Did the deliberative exercise have substantial
political effects? Did it trigger a larger public debate? The answer to these initial questions
is most probably negative.31
Yet, the Austrian experience raises interesting questions. One might reflect on the
Austrian case in the context of a broader international development, in the course of which
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political systems adopt deliberative techniques in potentially contentious modernization
fields. Comparative aspects arising from such a perspective ask for local conditions
furthering, impeding or modifying the normative objectives of this practice. More specifi-
cally, one might ask whether the non-controversial nature of the issue had any impact on the
process. It appears that the lack of a public controversy was among the factors providing the
ground for the harmonious course of the citizens’ deliberations and the ease by which they
attained consensus. If one considers the Austrian controversy over agri-food biotechnology
in the 1990s—which generated one of the fiercest technological controversies ever in this
country and which did not leave any scope for compromise in virtually hundreds of public
round tables taking place at that time—this is not a trivial achievement. But there seems to
be a price that is paid for harmony, at least if one takes the example described above, an
example of an event with no political impacts of significance and irrelevant in the media.
If that is the case, one might wonder, why run the deliberative exercise at all? Publicly,
the event remained hardly visible, politically a non-event. But perhaps it is precisely these
qualities that make the issue eligible for examination. In fact, a number of observers
concluded that issues were selected precisely because they were not on the public agenda,
debates mediated in ways excluding contentious matters. The proximate reasons for this
cautious approach might be sought in the organizers’ stated aim of primarily “trying out” a
communication technique in vogue. Co-opted actors might have had their respective
motivations, ranging from taking part in an academic exercise to promoting the traditional
view of a “Public Understanding of Science,” while the funding body understood it as part
of an awareness package for the advancement of science and technology. At any rate, it was
desirable for the consensus conference to become a “success,” with success being defined as
accomplishing a state-of-the-art consensus conference with some presentable “consensus” as
output. The normative reason of somehow improving democracy by instigating an ac-
claimed, new form of participatory device could function as an overarching narrative for all
participants and the public alike while the fact that democracy implies both consensus and
contention could be disregarded for the moment.
Furthermore, one might ask how much of the outcome was the result of the design of
the consensus conference itself and how much was due to Austria’s sociopolitical context.
As has been pointed out, Austria has no great tradition of experimentation with citizen
participation; neither do its rather conservative political culture, bureaucratic paternalism,
party dominance, and traditional consociationalism provide receptive conditions for inclu-
sionary, deliberative initiatives. In this regard, it stands in stark contrast to Denmark, with its
“historically rooted predilection for integrative processes” (Whiteside, 2003: 155). This
difference alone would not preclude a deliberative evolution in Austrian science and
technology policy—sociopolitical contexts might change—but current ruptures were not
favorable to the emergence of such a tendency either. On the contrary, the Austrian Wende
rather intensified adversarial politics and, in the fields of science and technology, diminished
existing forms of deliberation and participation by instating more centralized and hierarchi-
cal decision structures.
If one accepts the premise that public (or media) interest increases with the potential
political consequence of an event—an assertion which, at least in the negative, is supported
by the Austrian case—a consensus conference would need to have some political weight to
attract attention and catalyze broader public debates. This, however, would require political
decision-makers to allow for its outcomes to be unpredictable and to have real consequences
or, in other words, for a sharing of power. Nothing in current developments hints at such a
willingness.
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This is not to say, that Austrian policy of technological modernization is usurped by
party politics, opaque bureaucracies and corporate interests, nor that it is entirely un-
responsive to public demands. A case in point illustrating the contrary is the Austrian
movement against agro-alimentary biotechnology. While this movement pervades many EU
countries, its Austrian manifestation is clearly among the most vigorous, comparable to
those in Denmark, France, Italy or Greece. It was, to give some measure, powerful enough
to deter any genetically modified organism (GMO) release into the environment and to push
authorities to set up complex legislation designed to preclude commercial releases of GMOs
for years to come. This compliance with public demands is not to be underestimated as it
impinges upon significant corporate interests and puts government at risk of colliding with
more permissive EU legislation. The victory of this movement, however, is not due to
exercises in public deliberation but to the exertion of public pressure.
Once more, we face the dilemma of “problematic publics” which—in order to have
some political impact—become entangled in the game of power and prove resistant to any
attempt of their being deliberatively “domesticated.” From a Habermasian viewpoint, this
state of affairs seems deplorable, and to some, the Danish model, having set out on its
astonishing international career, appears as a promising approach to resolve the dilemma.
From this experience in Austria demonstrating another application of the deliberative
practice, one might arrive at more ambivalent conclusions.
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Notes
1 For the gulf between a rhetoric of openness, increasingly popular among policymakers, and the institutional
reforms required for its realization see Levidow and Marris (2001).
2 For a comprehensive outline of democracy’s diversity see Held (1996), for demanding models of democracy,
Cohen and Rogers (1995) and Fishkin (1991).
3 A notable example for an expert-based variant of participatory TA was set by Wolfgang van den Daele et al.’s
discursive arrangement treating the contested environmental and health risks of transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops. Representatives of corporate promoters and civil society opponents of agricultural biotechnology
engaged in a controlled “ideal discourse” on the risks of genetically modified food crops. Since they were
provided with all scientific expertise necessary to warrant their argumentation the procedure ultimately resulted
in the creation of an interdisciplinary library on the contested issue. Expertise thus antagonistically assembled
ultimately proved useful to regulatory elites (Van den Daele et al., 1997). An account of a “Technology Delphi”
is given by Grabner et al. (2002). The same anthology also contains various accounts of types of participatory
TA which promote laypeople’s rather than expert deliberations. In fact, “consensus conferences” to be
discussed shortly can also be understood as forms of participatory TA. For an article epitomizing the early,
elitist discourse on the “Public Understanding of Science” see Durant et al. (1989).
4 In recent years, an academic discussion on the formal evaluation of consensus conferences has unfolded. For an
early assessment of a Dutch consensus conference see Mayer et al. (1995). Joss (1998) assesses the deliberative
procedure in its Danish place of origin. The first holding of a Danish-style consensus conference in the United
States is analyzed in Guston (1999). For a recent German consensus conference see Zimmer (2002), for
Australia see Mohr (2002). For a first comparative framework see Mayer and Geurts (1998). Further
suggestions for a more formalized assessment were put forward in Rowe and Frewer (2000) and Rowe et al.
(2004). For pioneering comparative work see Einsiedel et al. (2001).
5 The “Teknologie-Rådet,” established in 1985 (http://www.tekno.dk). It is worthwhile noting that the consensus
conference is only one within a wider repertoire of deliberative procedures employed and in part developed by
the Technology Board, consisting of citizens’ and parliamentary hearings, development spaces, future panels,
future search and voting conferences, perspective and scenario workshops, and policy role plays. Among these
84 Public Understanding of Science 15 (1)
the consensus conference and the scenario workshop are genuine developments of the Technology Board
(Andersen and Jaeger, 1999).
6 Of which Jesper Lassen noted: 
What is characteristic about the Danish development is that besides the rather traditional assessment of the
new biotechnologies by experts, an important part of the policy has been to stimulate a public assessment
taking place among the citizens, at debate meetings, at consensus conferences or in the media. The . . .
public assessment has perhaps more worked as a way to secure a peaceful introduction of the new
biotechnologies, rather than as a tool to shape the technologies in accordance with the results of the public
assessment. (Lassen, 1999: 82)
7 A case in point is the French controversy over biotechnology in the course of which the first consensus
conference in France, the “confe´rence citoyenne,” was held in summer 1998. What is remarkable about the
event is the outstanding media attention and political salience it gained, mainly due to the importance of
government discourse allocated to it while going through a profound policy change: “the people” was to be
“inscribed” into the emerging “policy-narrative” (Gottweis, 1988). Equally remarkable is that, in spite of the
public dramatization of the confe´rence, critique could not be placated. In fact, the full blown French anti-
biotechnology mobilization, connected with field trial vandalism and the vocal farmers’ group “Confe´de´ration
Paysanne” only came into existence about a year after the event (Joly and Marris, 2003; Joly et al., 2003). For
a discussion of the consensus conference and subsequent deliberative events in the context of French political
culture see Whiteside (2003). Instructive regarding the appearance of and semiotic strategies adopted by the
Confe´de´ration Paysanne are Heller (2002) and Martin (2005).
8
Symbolic politics means that—by way of invocations, promises and assurances—the public is given the
impression its interests are effectively taken care of. In Austria, the theatrical pathos of an ostensible
controversy always goes along with consociational decision-making. Austrian functionaries often practice
harmony internally while pretending disagreement on the surface. (Gerlich, 1997: 508, original
German)
9 Hence, already in the late 1980s and 1990s decision-makers in the reluctantly emerging field of science and
technology policy repeatedly came up with demands for an enhancement of public awareness.
10 The popular initiative is—beside the referendum and the public opinion poll—one of three instruments of direct
democracy provided by the Austrian constitution and after having been held 31 times in the postwar republic it
is the one most frequently applied. Its function is to oblige parliament to address a legislative initiative,
provided the initiative rallies at least 100 000 signatures. As parliament decides and popular initiatives
frequently are being exploited by the opposition its claims quite often remain without concrete consequences.
Nevertheless, the level of citizens’ support mobilized clearly points the way for government who would hardly
get away with ignoring a successful initiative’s demands. The claims advanced in the popular initiative against
biotechnology—no GMO releases on Austrian ground, no GM food and no patents on life—mirror the general
thrust of the popular movement driven by ecological, agricultural and religious NGOs as well as the highly
influential Austrian yellow press. It is important to note, however, that the movement’s framing of the issue as
well as its political effect is restricted to agro-alimentary biotechnology and hardly alludes to other contentious
matters related to modern biotechnology such as eugenics or privacy.
11 Several factors account for the change: coalescing with the right-wing FP ¨O constituted the breaking of a taboo
and triggered an unparalleled protest wave. The Social Democrats’ loss of power after three decades of
government entailed bitter reshufflings in public service, and, finally, the far-reaching conservative reform
programme had to be carried through against stiff opposition. After re-elections in 2002 which resulted in a
clear confirmation of the People’s Party and an equally clear defeat of the FP ¨O, the ¨OVP–FP ¨O government was
reinstated. The remarkable electoral victory of the ¨OVP rendered subsequent oppositional critique difficult and
the intensity of public controversy somewhat decreased. Nevertheless, the seemingly harmonious days of the
Grand Coalition and consociationalism were gone for good.
12 The term “Wende,” if used in a sociopolitical context, designates an epochal change or turn of events. The
German “Wende,” for instance, stands for the demise of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) in
1989.
13 Protests, however, never prompted public debate about educational, science and technology policy as such.
They remained confined to those directly affected by reforms, principally in academia, who, as specialized
groups, were often seen as privileged and did not succeed in raising public compassion or advancing persuasive
issue-definitions.
14 “Citizens’ conference: Genetic data—wherefrom, whereto, wherefore?”
Seifert: A consensus conference in Austria 85
15 The first consensus conference dealt with tropospheric ozone and took place in 1997 in Vienna. Suffering from
resource scarcity it neither produced satisfying results nor influenced policy to an extent worth noting (Grabner
et al., 2002: 62–6).
16 ¨Osterreichischer Rundfunk.
17 Interview with organizers, 3 March 2004, on file with the author.
18 For “GENome research in AUstria” (http://www.gen-au.at/). Modeled after the German Human Genome
Project (http://www.dhgp.de/) and endowed with a three-year budget of h31 612 million, this, so far, is the
biggest Austrian technology program ever and aims at enhancing Austria’s competitiveness in the international
high-tech field. It is worth mentioning that, in spite of its importance in terms of financial support, GEN-AU
never provoked any major controversy from the Austrian public.
19 Interview with organizers, 3 March 2004, on file with the author.
20 Equally, the PR agency in charge of the virtual platform (www.innovatives-oesterreich.at) had been engaged in
the preceding biotechnology conflict, working to restore the public image of industry whose popularity had been
tremendously reduced in the controversy. Conversely, dialog < > gentechnik had consistently refused industry’s
support in order to avoid being construed as self-interested (Seifert, 2002: 194–5, 205).
21 Some observers raised similar critiques (Riegler and Knoll, 2002).
22 The Austrian Council later commissioned the TA institution to carry out the the conference’s evaluation.
23 Nonetheless, internal tensions never completely evaporated (interview with journalist, 26 April 2004, on file
with the author).
24 Among the 105 applicants there was a clear surplus of retirees and housewives and a respective lack of
candidates in the younger and economically active population, which had to be corrected in the further selection
procedure in order to fit demographic criteria. This disproportion could be taken as an indication for a rather
low attractiveness of the topic which might also explain the generally low return rate.
25 One participant left the group after the first sessions for personal reasons.
26 As shown by an online inquiry in parliamentary protocols for the keyword “Bu¨rgerInnenkonferenz” which
results in only two hits: the first document notes the ceremonial handing over of the recommendations of the
consensus conference to the Chairman of Parliament, the second is a statement of accounts which lists the
consensus conference as an element of the PR campaign instigated by the Austrian Council.
27 Interview with administration, 2 June 2005, on file with the author.
28 Interview with constitutional lawyer, 13 June 2005, on file with the author.
29 The law had been amended the year before in order to transpose the EU directive on the contained use of
genetically modified micro-organisms (98/81/EC) into national law, and it was amended again in 2004 to adapt
to the amended EU directive on the deliberate release into the environment of GMOs (2001/18/EC). Neither of
these amendments had any reference whatsoever to questions related to genetic data.
30 Only in this sense, the—often quoted—”finding” that citizens proved capable of absorbing specialized
knowledge and formulating reasonable policy recommendations can be considered a criterion for the exercise’s
success. The fact that laypeople who are motivated to learn and provided with the required means are able to
become as competent decision-makers as “the real” experts borders on banality. Besides, it is a principal
assumption underlying the very possibility of democracy.
31 Thus an—albeit preliminary—finding which, at least, does not contradict Steve Rayner’s more general verdict:
“There have been almost no credible outcome-based evaluations that have established that a public participation
technique has led to a technically or socially sound outcome that otherwise would not have been reached”
(Rayner, 2003: 167).
References 
Andersen, I. and Jaeger, B. (1999) “Scenario Workshops and Consensus Conferences: Towards More Democratic
Decision-Making,” Science and Public Policy 26(5): 331–40.
Barber, B. (1984) Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Cohen, J. and Rogers, J. (1995) Associations and Democracy. London: Verso.
Communication Matters (ed.) (2003) Bu¨rgerInnenkonferenz: Genetische Daten Woher, Wohin, Wozu? Wien:
Communication Matters.
Davison, A., Barnes, I. and Schibeci, R. (1997) “Problematic Publics: A Critical Review of Surveys of Public
Attitudes to Biotechnology,” Science Technology & Human Values 22(3): 317–48.
Durant, J., Evans, G.A. and Thomas, G.P. (1989) “The Public Understanding of Science,” Nature 340: 11–14.
Einsiedel, E.F., Erling, J. and Breck, T. (2001) “Publics at the Technology Table: the Consensus Conference in
Denmark, Canada and Australia,” Public Understanding of Science 10(1): 83–98.
86 Public Understanding of Science 15 (1)
Fishkin, J. (1991) Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Gerlich, P. (1997) “Politische Kultur der Subsysteme,” in H. Dachs, P. Gerlich, H. Gottweis, F. Horner, V. Lauber
and W. Mu¨ller (eds) Handbuch des politischen Systems ¨Osterreichs, pp. 506–13. Wien: Manz.
Gottweis, H. (1988) Governing Molecules. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gottweis, H. (2000) “Politische Mobilisierung, Bu¨rgerInnenbewegungen und Ansa¨tze zur Ausbildung neuer
Organisationsformen von Politik in ¨Osterreich,” Informationen zur politischen Bildung 17: 60–7.
Grabner, P., Peissl, W. and Torgerson, H. (2002) “Austria: Methodological Innovations from a Latecomer,” in
S. Joss and S. Bellucci (eds) Participatory Technology Assessment, pp. 61–74. London: University of
Westminster Press.
Guston, D.H. (1999) “Evaluating the first U.S. Consensus Conference: the Impact of the Citizens’ Panel on
Telecommunications and the Future of Democracy,” Science, Technology & Human Values 24(4): 451–82.
Held, D. (1996) Models of Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Heller, C. (2002) “From Scientific Risk to paysan savoir-faire: Peasant Expertise in the French and Global Debate
over GM Crops,” Science as Culture 11(1): 5–37.
Joly, P.-B. and Marris, C. (2003) “La participation contre la mobilisation? Une analyse compare´e du debat sur les
OGM en France et au Royaume-Uni,” Revue Internationale de Politique Compare´e 10(2): 195–206.
Joly, P.-B., Marris, C. and Hermitte, M.-A. (2003) “ `A la recherche d’une ‘democratie technique’—Enseignements
de la confe`rence citoyenne sur les OGM en France,” Natures Science Socie´te´ 11: 3–15.
Joss, S. (1998) “Danish Consensus Conferences as a Model of Participatory Technology Assessment: an Impact
Study of Consensus Conferences on Danish Parliament and Danish Public Debate,” Science and Public Policy
25(1): 2–22.
Lare´do, P. and Mustar, P. (eds) (2001) Research and Innovation Policies in the New Global Economy. Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar.
Lassen, J. (1999) “Changing Modes of Biotechnology Assessment in Denmark,” in R. Miettinen (ed.) Bio-
technology and Public Understanding of Science, pp. 82–90. Helsinki: Academy of Finland.
Levidow, L. and Marris, C. (2001) “Science and Governance in Europe: Lessons from the Case of Agricultural
Biotechnology,” Science and Public Policy 28(5): 345–60.
Martin, J.-P. (2005) “La Confe´de´ration paysanne et Jose´ Bove´, des actions me´diatiques au service d’un projet?,”
Ruralia, January [online]. Available: http://ruralia.revues.org/document142.html.
Mayer, I. and Geurts, J. (1998) “Consensus Conferences as Participatory Policy Analysis: A Methodological
Contribution to the Social Management of Technology,” in P. Wheale, R. Schomberg and P. Glasner (eds)
The Social Management of Genetic Engineering, pp. 279–301. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Mayer, I., De Vries, J. and Geurts, J. (1995) “An Evaluation of the Effects of Participation in a Consensus
Conference,” in S. Joss and J. Durant (eds) Public Participation in Science: the Role of Consensus
Conferences in Europe, pp. 109–24. London: Science Museum.
Menasse, P. (2003) “Warum eine PR-Agentur eine Bu¨rgerInnenkonferenz organisiert,” in Communication Matters
(ed.) Bu¨rgerInnenkonferenz: Genetische Daten Woher, Wohin, Wozu?, p. 68. Wien: Communication Matters.
Mohr, A. (2002) “Of Being Seen to do the Right Thing: Provisional Findings from the First Australian Consensus
Conference on Gene Technology in the Food Chain,” Science and Public Policy 29(1): 2–12.
Rayner, S. (2003) “Democracy in the Age of Assessment: Reflections on the Roles of Expertise and Democracy in
Public-sector Decision Making,” Science and Public Policy 30(3): 163–70.
RFT (Rat fu¨r Forschung und Technologieentwicklung) (2003) Ta¨tigkeitsbericht. Wien: RFT.
Riegler, J. and Knoll, E.M. (2002) “Kultur liegt in der Natur des Menschen!,” September [online]. Available: http:/
/science.orf.at/science/gingrich/58685.
Rowe, G. and Frewer, L.J. (2000) “Public Participation Methods: A Framework for Evaluation,” Science,
Technology & Human Values 25(1): 3–29.
Rowe, G., Marsh, R. and Frewer, L.J. (2004) “Evaluation of a Deliberative Conference,” Science, Technology &
Human Values 29(1): 88–121.
science.orf.at (2003) “Forderungen der Bu¨rgerInnenkonferenz liegen vor,” June ronlineo. Available: http:/
/science.orf.at/science/news/79025.
Seifert, F. (2002) Gentechnik – ¨Offentlichkeit – Demokratie: Der o¨sterreichische Gentechnik-Konflikt im inter-
nationalen Kontext. Mu¨nchen: Profil.
Seifert, F. (2003) “Demokratietheoretische ¨Uberlegungen zum o¨sterreichischen Gentechnik-Konflikt,” SWS-
Rundschau 43: 106–28.
Van den Daele, W., Pu¨hler, A. and Sukopp, H. (1997) Transgenic Herbicide-Resistant Crops: A Participatory
Technology Assessment. Berlin: WZB.
Seifert: A consensus conference in Austria 87
Weale, A. (2001) “Science Advice, Democratic Responsiveness and Public Policy,” Science and Public Policy
28(6): 413–21.
Whiteside, K.H. (2003) “French Regulatory Republicanism and the Risks of Genetically Engineered Crops,”
French Politics 1: 153–74.
Zimmer, R. (2002) “Begleitende Evaluation der Bu¨rgerkonferenz ‘Streitfall Gendiagnostik,’” Fraunhofer Institut
fu¨r Systemtechnik und Innovationsforschung, Karlsruhe [online]. Available: http://www.isi.fhg.de/bt/projekte/
buergerkonf.
Author
Franz Seifert is a biologist and political scientist and currently working as an
independent social researcher in Vienna. He has participated in various international
projects on bio-politics and has ample experience in survey-, media- and policy-analysis
as well as democratic theory pertaining to bio-politics and related policy fields. At
present, he is directing a study on transnational aspects of the Austrian biotechnology
controversy. Correspondence: Maxingstrasse 22–24/2/7, A-1130 Vienna, Austria, e-mail:
fseifert@gmx.at
88 Public Understanding of Science 15 (1)
